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Abstract
In an economy with search on credit and labor markets, a financial multiplier raises
the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks. This multiplier increases
with total financial costs, which are minimized under a credit market Hosios-Pissarides
rule. Relaxing that condition leads to either a small "bank " or a small "firm" surplus in
the credit market, and larger multipliers which can match or even overshoot the elasticity
of market tightness in the data. Furthermore, when wages are endogenous, it is possible to
relax Hagedorn and Manovskii’s (2008) small labor surplus assumption in order to match
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1 Introduction
Cole and Rogerson (1999) and Shimer (2005) have investigated the cyclical properties of the
search matching models following Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). The
celebrated Shimer’s puzzle is the demonstration of the inability of the conventional matching
model to replicate the US statistics regarding the volatility of job vacancies, unemployment and
their ratio (called labor market tightness), in response to productivity shocks. His main finding
is that the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks is around 20 in the data, and
around 1 in a calibration of the Mortensen-Pissarides model. Several calibration improvements
have been proposed, including raising the model value of non-employment utility (Hagedorn
and Manovskii 2008), wage rigidity (Hall 2005) and on-the-job search (Mortensen and Nagypàl
2007).
One line of research that has so far been ignored but seems promising is the existence of
credit market imperfections. In this paper we pursue this logic, following two previous papers.
On the one hand, Petrosky-Nadeau (2009) shows that introducing credit market imperfections,
with in particular costly state verification, in a search model can lead to a large amplification
of the volatility of labor market tightness. The standard deviation in his model of the vacancy-
unemployment ratio approaches 12.5 relative to that of output, while it is 15.4 in US data and
merely 3.7 in the standard search model. Credit market imperfections induce an amplification
factor of 3.5.
On the other hand, Wasmer and Weil (2004), who develop financial imperfections in a
Mortensen-Pissarides economy with two matching functions (one in the labor market, one in
the credit market), show that the steady-state volatility of labor market tightness to profit shocks
is augmented by a factor 1.7 by the existence of moderate credit market imperfections. They
call this a financial accelerator, in line with an earlier literature.
Despite recent papers attempting to bring together credit market imperfections and the
search-matching approach, the macro-labor literature has been slow to incorporate the well-
known message of an earlier literature. Indeed, it has been known for a while that credit
market imperfections generate additional volatility of the business cycle. Early papers such
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as Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and subsequent papers (such as
Bernanke and Gertler 1995, Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist 1996, and several others), have em-
phasized the amplification role of credit markets and the existence of a financial accelerator.
Although part of this literature is centered on the role of credit shocks and the credit channel
of monetary policy, the ingredients generating the amplification of credit shocks can very well
be adapted to the amplification of business cycle shocks to labor markets.
Firms in our model arise the result of the meeting of an entrepreneur and a banker on a
frictional credit market. The average cost of creating a firm is the sum of all prospecting costs
on the credit market which, compared to the world with perfect credit markets in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), imposes a lower limit on the value of a job vacancy to a firm. Consequently,
frictional credit markets limit firm entry on the labor market, resulting in a greater equilibrium
rate of unemployment. Our results regarding the amplification of productivity shocks in this
double matching economy can be summarized as follows.
First, consistent with Wasmer and Weil (2004), financial imperfections raise the calibrated
elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks by a factor M f called the financial
multiplier, which is an increasing function of total financial costs in the economy. Second,
a Hosios-Pissarides rule exists in the credit market : the bargaining power of firms vis-à-vis
banks is equal, at the social optimum, to the elasticity of the finding rate of banks with respect
to credit market tightness. Third, under the Hosios rule, the search costs in the credit market
are minimized, and so is M f . Relaxing that condition leads to a larger financial accelerator,
which can match or even overshoot the elasticity of market tightness in the data.
Fourth, away from the Hosios rule, four situations generate a large or very large volatility:
i) When the matching function in the credit market is "balanced", e.g. a Cobb-Douglas with
elasticity around half for each segment of the market (banks and entrepreneurs) and when
entrepreneurs have a very low bargaining power in the bargaining relation with the bank; ii)
The symmetrical case with balanced matching in the credit market but when entrepreneurs
have a very high bargaining power in the bargaining relation with the bank, which corresponds
to, and corroborates the results of, Petrosky-Nadeau (2009); iii) When instead the matching
function is unbalanced, corresponding to a situation in which credit creation is limited by the
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"ideas of entrepreneurs", that is an excess of liquidity; iv) When the matching function is
unbalanced on the other side, corresponding to a situation in which credit creation is limited by
"supply of liquidity," that is a scarcity of liquidity. Finally, these results hold with endogenous
or exogenous wages and in a deterministic or stochastic setup, e.g., one can obtain any high
elasticity of labor market volatility to productivity shocks in each of the four cases identified
above.
The last result with regards to endogenous wages speaks strongly to what we will call the
"small labor surplus" assumption often followed in the literature in order to raise the elas-
ticity of labor market tightness to productivity. This approach, suggested by Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008), rests on choosing high values of non-employment activities and very low
values for the bargaining power of workers. However, as Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) point
out, this assumption implies that there is very little utility gain to accepting a job, nor does it
fit well with estimates of the value of non-employment. Financial imperfections in our model
enable usto relax the "small surplus" assumption in order to match the elasticity of market
tightness to productivity found in the data. Therefore, our results are readily interpreted as a
generalization of the small surplus assumption: when the credit market is either very tight or
very slack for firms, one side of the market has a very small surplus to entering the relationship.
Consequently, the entry of that side of the credit market is restricted and even small productiv-
ity shocks can generate large relative increases in the number of agents on the restricted side
of the market.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the main equations in
Wasmer and Weil (2004) and calculate the volatility of labor market tightness to productivity
shocks. In Section 3, we show how the Hosios rule in the credit market affects the volatility
of the labor market. In Section 4, we proceed to the calibrations of the stochastic variants
of the model with and without credit market imperfections, and we show how changing the
parameters of the model related to the credit matching technology substantially raises this
elasticity. In Section 5, we extend the model to endogenous wages. In Section 6 we conclude.
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2 An economy with credit and labor market frictions
2.1 Model
Time is continuous and there are three types of agents: entrepreneurs with no capital; banks
with no ability to produce; and workers with no capital and no ability to start a business. The
timing of events for entrepreneurs is asthat they initially need to find a "banker" in order to start
a business. This search process costs e units of effort per unit of time. Search is successful with
probability p. The newly formed firm, from the successful meeting of entrepreneur and banker,
then goes to the labor market. The bank finances the vacancy posting cost γ to attract workers
(the so-called recruitment costs) for the firm. This search process succeeds with probability
q. The firm is then able to produce and sell in the good market, which generates a flow profit
y−w−ρ where y is the marginal product, w is the wage (assumed exogenous in this section,
bargained in Section 5), r is the flow rate of discount, and ρ is the flow repayment to the
bank (determined through bargaining). Jobs are subject to destruction shocks with Poisson
parameter s. The steady-state asset values of the entrepreneurs are denoted by E j with j = c, l
or g the market in which the entrepreneur is operating, standing respectively for the credit, labor
and good markets. We also assume free entry at the first stage, that is Ec ≡ 0. We therefore
have the following Bellman equations:
rEc = 0 =−e+ pEl (1)
rEl = 0+q(Eg−El) (2)
rEg = y−w−ρ+ s(0−E). (3)
In the last line, it was assumed that job destruction also leads to the destruction of the firm and
the lending relation with the bank.
Symmetrically, the bank’s asset values are denoted by B j, j= c, l or g for each of the stages.
We also assume free entry of the banking relationship: Bc = 0. We denote by k the screening
cost per unit of time of banks in the first stage, and by p̂ the Poisson rate at which a bank finds
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a firm to be financed. We have:
rBc = 0 =−k+ p̂Bl (4)
rBl = −γ+q(Bg−Bl) (5)
rBg = ρ+ s(0−Bg). (6)
The matching rates p and p̂ are made mutually consistent by the existence of a match-
ing function Mc(B,E ), where B and E are respectively the number of bankers and of en-
trepreneurs in stage c. This function is assumed to have constant returns to scale. Hence,
denoting by φ the ratio E /B, which is a reflection of the tension in the credit market and that
we shall call credit market tightness from the point of view of entrepreneurs, we have
p =
Mc(B,E )
E
= p(φ) with p′(φ)< 0.
p̂ = φ p(φ) with p̂′(φ)> 0.
After the contact, the bank and the entrepreneur engage in bargaining about ρ which is such
that
(1−β )Bl = βEl (7)
where β is the bargaining power of the bank relative to the entrepreneur. With β = 0 the bank
leaves all the surplus to the entrepreneur.
Combining (1), (4) and (7), we obtain the equilibrium value of φ denoted by φ∗ with
φ∗ =
k
e
1−β
β
.
Matching in the labor market is denoted by Ml(V ,u) where u is the rate of unemployment
and the total number of unemployed workers since the labor force is normalized to 1. V is the
number of "vacancies", that is the number of firms in stage l. The function is also assumed to
be constant return to scale, hence the rate at which firms fill vacancies is a function of the ratio
V /u, that is tightness of the labor market. We have
q(θ) =
Ml(V ,u)
V
with q′(θ)< 0.
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Further using (2), (3) and (5), (6), we finally simultaneously solve for ρ :
ρ
r+ s
= β
y−w
r+ s
+(1−β ) γ
q(θ)
and obtain the two main equations of the model :
(EE) :
e
p(φ)
=
q(θ)
r+q(θ)
(
y−w
r+ s
− γ
q(θ)
)
(1−β ) (8)
(BB) :
κ
φ p(φ)
=
q(θ)
r+q(θ)
(
y−w
r+ s
− γ
q(θ)
)
β (9)
Each equation provides a link between θ and φ that is of opposite sign. There is therefore
at most one equilibrium set of (θ ∗,φ∗).1 Finally, summing up (EE) and (BB), one obtains
a single market equation denoted by (CC) for θ ∗ describing a job creation condition for this
double matching economy:
(CC):
e
p(φ∗)
+
k
φ∗p(φ∗)
=
q(θ)
r+q(θ)
(
y−w
r+ s
− γ
q(θ)
)
(10)
where the left-hand side is a measure of the total amount of search costs in financial markets.
These are the total financial costs associated with the creation of a firm and that we shall denote
by K ≡ ep(φ∗) + kφ∗p(φ∗) .
2.2 Steady-state volatility of θ to shocks
We now want to calculate the elasticity of θ to profit shocks, denoted by ζθ/pi . Let θP be the
value of tightness solving for
y−w
r+ s
=
γ
q(θP)
(11)
The value of θP defined here is the credit frictionless world in Pissarides (1985), which one
would obtain from (10) when K = 0. In using (CC), one has:
γ
q(θP)
− γ
q(θ ∗)
= K
(
r+q(θ ∗)
q(θ ∗)
)
> 0
Hence, given that q′ is downward sloping, we have that θ ∗< θP , as was shown in Wasmer and
Weil (2004) and arises in Petrosky-Nadeau (2009), and the difference is precisely due to the
1Wasmer and Weil (2004) provide a condition for existence.
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existence of search costs in the credit market. Let pi = (y−w)/(r+s) be the present discounted
value of profits. Posing r = 0 to marginally simplify the analysis, we have an equilibrium job
creation condition under frictional credit markets which states that the profit flows from a job
net of the total financial costs to creating a firm must equal the average cost of filling a job
vacancy:
pi−K = γ
q(θ ∗)
. (12)
Taking logs and differentiating, we have
−q
′(θ ∗)θ ∗
q(θ)∗
dθ
θ ∗
=
dpi
pi
pi
pi−K
or, reusing (11) and (12) and where η =−q′(θ)θ/q(θ) is the (non-necessarily constant) elas-
ticity of q to θ , we have
ζθ/pi =
d lnθ
d lnpi
=
1
η
γ
q(θP)
γ
q(θ∗)
=
1
η
q(θ ∗)
q(θP)
Two remarks are in order. First, in the (credit) frictionless world in Pissarides, the elasticity is
simply the inverse of the elasticity of q to θ , that is 1/η . Second, the existence of credit market
imperfections reduces θ ∗ relative to θP, and therefore raise the volatility ζθ/pi by a factor due
to the financial accelerator identified in Wasmer and Weil (2004): higher profits raise the entry
of firms, hence banks make faster profits, which in turn benefits firms, and so on. Denote by
M f =
q(θ ∗)
q(θP)
the value of the financial accelerator, which can more generically be defined as the ratio of
the elasticity in a world with credit frictions and the elasticity in a world where credit frictions
disappear.
Under the assumption of an exogenous wage, the response of this economy to productivity
shocks on y is therefore :
ζθ/y =
d lnθ
d lny
=
d lnθ
d lnpi
d lnpi
d lny
=
1
η
y
y−wM f
The first component of this elasticity is the amplification due to the existence of search frictions
on the labor market. The second component is the gap between wages and marginal product -
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the smaller the gap, the more responsive job creation is to productivity shocks; and finally, the
third is the financial accelerator.
With the parameters values in Wasmer and Weil (2004), η = 0.5, y = 1, w = 2/3, and
M f = 1.74, such that
ζθ/y = 2×3×1.74 = 10.44.
This is a large factor compared to the conventional Pissarides model elasticity as in Shimer
(2005), for example, who found a much smaller number value of 1.13. This difference is due
to three factors :
1. the choice of the matching elasticity in Shimer (1/0.72) ; assuming η = 0.5 instead raises
the elasticity with respect to Shimer by a factor 2*0.72=1.44.
2. the assumption of wage rigidity in our model (see Hall 2005): in the absence of rigidity
in wages, the factor yy−w = 3 would have to be replaced by a more complex term, derived
and discussed later on in the part devoted to endogenous wages. In short, wage rigidity
raise volatility by a factor of 4 to 5.
3. The last part of the difference is due to the existence of a financial accelerator M f = 1.74,
consistent with the literature initiated by Bernanke and Gertler (1989).
The labor literature has attempted to raise the elasticity of market tightness to productivity with
either wage rigidities (Hall 2005) or by making what we will call hereafter the "small labor
surplus" assumption by choosing higher values of non-employment utility and lower values
for the bargaining power of workers (Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008) and reducing the gap
between wages and marginal product. While acknowledging the interest of these approaches,
we pursue another avenue here and attempt to understand the determinants of M f .
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3 Entry costs and efficiency in the credit market
3.1 Hosios-Pissarides in the credit market
We start by noting that frictions in the credit market may lead to a second best efficiency
condition similar to that in Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (1990).
To see this, we can calculate the social welfare function as output net of all search costs.
We have :
Ω= y(1−u)+ zu− γθu− kB− eE
where z is the value of non-employment utility and θu = V is the number of firms prospecting
in the labor market. To obtain a simpler expression for Ω, we can note that in a steady-state,
we have E p(φ) = q(θ)V which states that inflows into the financing stage are compensated
by outflows out of that stage. It follows that
E =
q(θ)θu
p(φ)
andB =
E
φ
=
q(θ)θu
φ p(φ)
Therefore, the social planner’s program can be rewritten as
max
u,θ ,φ
Ω = y(1−u)+ zu− γθu−
(
k
φ p(φ)
+
e
p(φ)
)
q(θ)θu
s.t. u = s/(s+θq(θ))
Relative to the choice of the optimal φ denoted by φopt , the problem is simple and block-
recursive in φ and then in u and θ . For the first block that we only consider here, the optimal
choice of φ amounts to minimizing total search costs K(φ) = kφ p(φ) +
e
p(φ) :
2
∂Ω
∂φ
= q(θ)θu
∂
∂φ
K(φ) = 0
⇔ φopt = 1− ε
ε
k
e
where ε =−φ p
′(φ)
p(φ)
2Intermediate steps are :
∂Ω
∂φ
= 0⇔ k
φ p(φ)
φ p′(φ)+ p(φ)
φ p(φ)
+
e
p(φ)
p′(φ)
p(φ)
= 0
⇔ k
φ p(φ)
(1− ε) = e
p(φ)
ε
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Hence, since ∂
2
∂φ2 K(φ)> 0, the socially optimal value of credit market tightness is the one that
minimizes search costs on credit markets. The Hosios-Pissarides rule, which states that there
is a value of the bargaining parameter over ρ that internalizes the matching externalities due to
the search frictions, applies here :
φ∗ = φopt
⇔ β = ε : Hosios condition in the credit market
3.2 Minimizing the financial costs and the gap between θ ∗ and θP
One may think that the Hosios condition is the one that minimizes entry costs in the credit
market. One can check this formally. The left-hand side of job creation condition (CC) is a
function of β and ε denoted by K(β ,ε) ; the right-hand side is increasing in θ . It is therefore
enough to show that K(β ,ε) is minimized in β = ε . Before doing so, we can use two interme-
diate steps. First, note that K(β ,ε) =
e
p(φ∗)
1−β from equation (EE) divided by (1−β ). Second, we
have ∂φ
∗
∂β =
−1
β 2
k
e hence
∂K
∂β
=
−ep′
p2(φ∗)
∂φ∗
∂β
1−β +
e
p(φ∗)
(1−β )2 = 0⇔ ε = β
Given that M f , and hence ζθ/y, is increasing in the gap between θ ∗ and θP, at any φ∗, the
Hosios condition in the credit market is the one minimizing the volatility induced by financial
imperfections. Away from this equation, one has a larger financial accelerator.
4 A stochastic extension and calibrations
In this Section, we study the model with departures from the above Hosios condition in the
credit market, i.e., with β 6= ε . For that, and in order to provide the most general results, we
relax the assumption that r = 0 and further calibrate the stochastic evolution of the double-
matching economy.
We make the following assumptions for convenience. First, time is discrete and labor
productivity is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process yt = ρyyt−1+νt , where 0< ρy < 1
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and νt is white noise. Second, an entrepreneur meeting a banker begins the recruiting process
within the period. A successful meeting between a firm and worker begins production the
following period. Maintaining our assumption of free entry on both sides of the credit market
and bargaining over ρ, we find that the equilibrium credit market tightness φ∗ is time invariant
and of the same form as earlier.3 Moreover, ρ is assumed to be determined when a banker and
an entrepreneur meet and is solved as
Et [ρt+1] = βEt [yt+1−w]+ (1−β )Et
[
(1+ r)γ
q(θt)
− (1− s)γ
q(θt+1)
]
(13)
where Et is an expectations operator over productivity and w is a fixed wage. The next section
will allow for an endogenous wage.
From the constant values of being in the recruiting stage, Bl,t = κφ∗p(φ∗) and El,t =
e
p(φ∗) ,
we can combine the (EE) and (BB) curves in this stochastic environment,
e
p(φ)
=
q(θt)
1+ r
Et
[
Eg,t+1
]
+
(1−q(θt))
1+ r
e
p(φ)
κ
φ p(φ)
= −γ+ q(θt)
1+ r
Et
[
Bg,t+1
]
+
(1−q(θt))
1+ r
κ
φ p(φ)
to obtain a job creation condition in the presence of frictional credit markets
Γt
q(θ ∗t )
=
1
1+ r
Et
[
yt+1−w+(1− s) Γt+1q(θ ∗t+1)
]
(14)
where Γt ≡ γ+K
(
1− 11+r (1−q(θ ∗t ))
)
are vacancy costs augmented for frictional credit mar-
kets and K = ep(φ∗) +
κ
φ∗p(φ∗) is once again total search costs on the credit market.
It is worth noting two special cases. First, when r = 0 , Γt is simply the sum of all prospec-
tion costs in credit and labor markets, unadjusted for discounting. Second, when credit markets
are perfect, Γt boils down to γ , and the job creation condition reduces to
γ
q(θPt )
=
1
1+ r
Et
[
yt+1−w+(1− s) γq(θPt+1)
]
(15)
3Time invariance follows from the sharing rule (1−β )Bl,t = βEl,t which implies a constant ratio El,tBl,t =
1−β
β .
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4.1 Elasticity of θt to productivity shocks
Define period profits from labor as Πt = yt −w. Taking log-linear deviations around a steady
state of equation (15), deviations in market tightness in the credit frictionless world can be
expressed as a discounted sum of deviations in future expected profits
θ̂Pt =
q(θP)Π
ηγ(1+ r)
Et
∞
∑
i=0
(
1− s
1+ r
)i
Π̂t+1+i
Given a fixed wage and the assumption on productivity, this is simply θ̂Pt =
q(θP)
ηγ(1+r)
∞
∑
i=0
ρ i+1y νt
such that the elasticity of market tightness to a productivity shock in the Pissarides world with
a fixed wage is
∂ θ̂Pt
∂νt
=
q(θP)ρy
ηγ [(1+ r)− (1− s)ρy] (16)
By the same steps, the elasticity in the presence of credit frictions is given by
∂ θ̂ ∗t
∂νt
=
q(θ ∗)ρy
ηγT [(1+ r)− (1− s)ρy] (17)
where γT ≡ [γ+K ( r1+r)] > γ is a measure of total frictional costs in both credit and labor
markets.
The financial multiplier in this dynamic setting is thus:
M f ≡ ∂ θ̂
∗
t /∂νt
∂ θ̂Pt /∂νt
=
q(θ ∗)
q(θP)
γ
γT
which is identical to the accelerator derived in Section 2 when r = 0. Finally, the elasticity of
the job finding rate is simply: ∂ f (θt)∂νt =
∂ f (θt)
∂θt
∂θt
∂νt = (1−η)
∂θt
∂νt
4.2 Calibration and results
We follow an incremental strategy, building on a calibration of the Pissarides model to a set
of steady state labor market outcomes at a quarterly frequency. In this section the wage is
assumed exogenous and equal to three quarters of labor productivity. The steady state rate of
job separation is set to s= 0.1. We assume an the elasticity of the labor matching function with
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respect to unemployment of η = 0.5.4 The labor matching function is assumed to be a Cobb-
Douglas Ml(V ,u) = χV 1−ηuη and, given a value for unit recruitment costs of γ = 0.25, we
adjust the level parameter χ to achieve a desired level of unemployment, approximately 10%
in this calibration. Finally, the risk free rate is set to 4%, corresponding to a 3-month treasury
bill, and the persistence coefficient in the process for productivity is set to 0.975, a commonly
used value in the real business cycle literature.
The calibration of the credit market requires choosing parameters of the credit match-
ing function, assumed to be of the form Mc(B,E ) = ςE 1−εBε , the costs of prospecting on
credit markets and the bargaining weight β . The baseline calibration adopts a "balanced" credit
matching function and the credit market Hosios condition; i.e., β = ε = 0.5, and symmetry in
prospecting costs κ = e = 0.05. The remaining parameter, ς , is set such that the excess gross
rate of return on a business loan R− r equal an annualized 15%.5
Table 1: Baseline results
q(θ) Wage
Elasticity
of θ
Elasticity
of f (θ)
Financial
accelerator M f
Pissarides
- fixed wage 0.11 0.75 6.48 3.24 1
Credit friction - fixed wage
β = 0.5,ε = 0.5 0.20 0.75 11.48 5.74 1.77
β = 0.2,ε = 0.8 0.72 0.75 39.11 19.56 6.04
β = 0.8,ε = 0.2 0.72 0.75 39.11 19.56 6.04
4See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for a survey of estimates of the labor matching function.
5The internal rate of return of loans to firms is the interest rates R that equalizes the expected present dis-
counted value of the loan γ/[R+q(θ ∗)] and the expected present discounted repayment on the loan {q(θ ∗)/[R+
q(θ ∗)]}{ρ/(R+ s)}. See Wasmer and Weil (2004).
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Table 1 presents the results for several scenarios. The first row shows that the Pissarides
model with a fixed wage yields an elasticity of labor market tightness of 6.48, which is 4.7
times greater than when wages are flexible (see Table 2). The next three rows present the
results for a multi-frictional economy. In the baseline calibration, the matching function is
"balanced" and the economy is at a Hosios condition on the credit market. The resulting
minimized financial accelerator has a value of 1.79, and the elasticity of labor market tightness
to productivity shocks is 11.57, values that are close to those obtained from our steady state
calculations.
When we move away from the credit market Hosios condition, the value of the financial
accelerator can become very large and the elasticity of market tightness to productivity shocks
overshoots the value in the data. Figure 1 presents the values of the elasticity of labor market
tightness to productivity shocks keeping a "balanced" credit matching function, i.e., ε = 0.5,
and varying the bargaining weight β between 0.1 and 0.9. As was known from the analysis in
Section 3, Figure 1 illustrates that the financial accelerator is minimized at β = ε = 0.5 and
increases away from this point.
At one extreme, e.g., when β is small, firms in the entry stage get a very low share of the
surplus. Hence, any small positive productivity shock leads to a large impact on the entry of
firms on the credit market. This is essentially a generalization of the small surplus idea in the
literature, and in particular of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), although applied to firms in a
different stage, that is before the production of the final good. Conversely, when β is close to
1 it is banks who get a small surplus. In that case, any small profit shock would lead to a large
relative increase in the number of prospecting banks and hence to a large amplification of the
same shock. The small surplus here corresponds to that of banks, and their optimal response to
shocks is therefore large.
We explore this further with two cases in which there are large departures in the degree of
matching externalities and creditor’s bargaining weight. In both cases, there is near linearity in
the matching function; first in the supply of creditors, second in the supply of entrepreneurs.
The results are shown in the last two rows of Table 1, and in the first (ε = 0.8) and second
(ε = 0.2) panels of Figure 4. Case 1 shows that if matching is near linear in supply of creditors
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Figure 1: Elasticity of job finding rate to productivity shocks.
and we depart from the credit market Hosios condition by reducing the bargaining weight of
bankers, the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks becomes potentially very
large. Intuitively, when entrepreneurs extract a larger share of the surplus generated by a firm
they respond more strongly to the change in productivity by wanting to enter the credit market.
On the other side of the market, the average search cost for creditors is relatively unresponsive
to the bankers entering the market from the near linearity in the matching function. As a result,
when ε = 0.8 and β = 0.2 the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks nears
40, and the financial accelerator contributes a factor M f = 6.04. A step further, at β = 0.15, the
elasticity exceeds 80. The exact inverse is observed when the matching function is near linear
in the supply of entrepreneurs (see the second panel of Figure 4).6
5 Extension: endogenous wages
Endogenous wages seriously reduce the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity
shocks. This paper must therefore address the question of, and replicate the analysis of the
previous section with, endogenous wages. We assume that the worker bargains the wage with
6The two regimes imply very different annualized excess return on the loan. In the first case, when the firm
has most of the weight in sharing the surplus, the excess return is 3.5%. In the second case, the excess return is
26%.
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Figure 2: Two cases for the credit market and the financial multiplier.
a firm, defined as the entrepreneur-banker block, at the time of meeting. There are two related
reasons for this choice.
The first one is that the natural alternative, bargaining between the entrepreneur and the
worker, leads to complex strategic interactions illustrated in Wasmer and Weil (2004, Section
IV-A): the entrepreneur and the bank wish to raise the debt of the firm above what is needed in
order to reduce the size of total surplus to be shared between the firm and the worker at a later
time. Hence, wages are driven down to the reservation wage of workers and do not vary with
the firm’s productivity, which is counterfactual. This leads to the second reason, which is that
we want our endogenous wage extension to be comparable to the classical wage solution in the
labor search literature in order to compare the volatility in the model to other elasticities found
in the literature.
Define the values of employment and unemployment in a discrete time stochastic setting as
Ut = z+ f (θt)βEtWt+1+(1− f (θt))βEtUt+1
Wt = wt +βEt [(1− s)Wt+1+ sUt+1]
where z is the value of non-employment activities and f (θ) = θq(θ) the job finding rate.
The Pissarides wage is wPt = α
(
yt + γθPt
)
+ (1− α)z where α is the bargaining power of
workers vis-à-vis the firm. Taking log-deviations, movements in labor market tightness to
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future productivity are given by
θ̂Pt =
q(θP)(1−α)
ηγ(1+ r)
Et
∞
∑
i=0
Ψiŷt+1+i
where the second term in Ψ=
(1−s
1+r
)− αθPq(θP)η(1+r) reflects the share of the change in productivity
accruing to the worker through the wage. The latter strongly reduces the elasticity of labor
market tightness to productivity shocks which, with our specification, is7
∂ θ̂Pt
∂νt
=
q(θP)(1−α)ρy
ηγ(1+ r)− γ [η(1− s)−α f (θP)]ρy (18)
Compared to the elasticity when wages are fixed, only a share (1−α) of the rise in productiv-
ity accrues to the firm. In addition, the equilibrium rise in labor market tightness following a
positive productivity shock improves the outside option of the worker and his bargaining posi-
tion in the wage determination. This appears in the denominator as the term α f (θP), further
reducing the elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity shocks.
Turning now to the responsiveness of labor market tightness under frictional credit markets,
we begin by detailing the determination of the wage. As discussed earlier, we assume that the
wage negotiated in a worker-firm pair, and in the presence of credit market frictions, it must
satisfy a sharing rule αFg,t = (1−α)(Wt−Ut),where Fg,t = Eg,t +Bg,t is the joint value of the
firm to the entrepreneur-banker pair. Under this assumption the wage is
wt = α [yt +Γtθ ∗t ]+ (1−α)z
and differs from the Pissarides wage by the coefficient Γt on market tightness. To the extent
that this term is negatively correlated with productivity, credit market frictions induce a certain
degree of wage rigidity by limiting the effect of a rise in market tightness on wages, a feature
also present in Petrosky-Nadeau (2009). To see why this is the case, recall that Γt ≡ γ +
K
(
1− 11+r (1−q(θ ∗t ))
)
are vacancy costs augmented for frictional credit markets. Since q is
decreasing in market tightness, so is Γ.
7To check the result, note that if ρy = 1 this is the elasticity obtained when comparing steady states, or to
a permanent productivity shock, as in Shimer (2005), i.e. εθ ,y =
(1−α)
γ
[
η(r+s)
q(θP)
+αθP
] . The details for deriving the
elasticities can be found in the appendix.
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Finally, the elasticity of labor market tightness under frictional credit markets and an en-
dogenous wage is
∂ θ̂ ∗t
∂νt
=
q(θ ∗)(1−α)ρy
ηγT (1+ r)− [ηγT (1−δ )−α f (θ ∗)(γT +(1−η)κ˜)]ρy (19)
where κ˜ ≡ K q(θ∗)1+r .
Table 2 presents the results when wages are endogenous following a similar calibration ex-
ercise as in the previous section, along with a Hosios condition on the labor market to determine
the bargaining weight α . We find an elasticity of labor market tightness when credit markets
are perfect and wages endogenous of 1.37. For the economy with a frictional credit market,
we focus on two sets of results: 1) the results for our baseline calibration and, 2) calibrating
to a small labor surplus. Table 2 reveals, first, that size of the financial accelerator is greater
in the presence of endogenous wages, rising from 1.79 to 2.14, the additional amplification
arising from the slight degree of wage rigidity outlined above. Second, amplification is less
sensitive to departures from the credit market Hosios condition. For β = 0.2 and ε = 0.8 the
financial accelerator reaches a factor of 2.54. Note that the magnitude of the multiplier in this
scenario also corroborates the results in Petrosky-Nadeau (2009). More extreme departures are
necessary for a large financial accelerator: at β = 0.1 and ε = 0.9 we obtain M f = 8.6.
The next section of Table 2 investigates the proposition that has appeared in the literature
of calibrating to a small labor surplus. Such a strategy, with α = 0.05 and z = 0.95, yields an
elasticity of 22.84 for the Pissarides model, approximately the elasticity in the data. When we
perform the same exercises in our model with both labor and credit market frictions under the
symmetric case β = ε = 0.5, we obtain an elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity
shocks of 49.27, overshooting the value in the data by a factor of 2.16. We then ask whether
frictional credit markets can explain the elasticity in the data without the stringent small labor
surplus assumption and propose two scenarios to achieve this. First, keeping the bargaining
weight at α = 0.05, the value of non-market activities necessary to match the elasticity of
market tightness in the data drops from 0.95 to 0.75, and the equilibrium wage from 0.96 to
0.83. Second, with a mixed strategy, it is possible to match the data with a greater weight to
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the worker in wage bargaining, 0.1, and a lower value of non-market activities z of 0.845.8
Table 2: Robustness to endogenous wages
q(θ) Wage Unemp.
Elast.
of θ
Elast.
of f (θ)
Financial
accel. M f
Elast. f (θ)
to z
Pissarides
- flexible wage 0.04 0.75 0.10 1.37 0.68 1 -0.104
Credit friction - flexible wage
β = 0.5,ε = 0.5 0.29 0.74 0.10 2.94 1.47 2.14 -0.225
β = 0.2,ε = 0.8 0.62 0.72 0.11 3.49 1.75 2.54 -0.265
β = 0.8,ε = 0.2 0.62 0.72 0.11 3.49 1.75 2.54 -0.265
Small labor surplus (Hagedorn and Manovskii 2008)
- Pissarides, α = 0.05,z = 0.95 0.27 0.96 0.10 22.84 11.42 1 -15.289
- Credit friction β = 0.5,ε = 0.5
α = 0.05, z = 0.95 0.74 0.96 0.10 49.27 24.64 2.16 -26.929
α = 0.05, z = 0.75 0.98 0.83 0.11 22.38 11.18 -
α = 0.10, z = 0.845 0.91 0.92 0.11 21.50 10.75 -
6 Conclusion
Financial imperfections raise the calibrated elasticity of labor market tightness to productivity
shocks by a factor M f called the financial multiplier. With exogenous wages, and without
assuming a small labor surplus, it is easy to generate a plausible large elasticity of labor market
tightness to productivity shocks, if one relaxes the Hosios-Pissarides rule in the credit market.
8It is important to note that in each of these exercises we have kept the discipline of maintaining the equilibrium
rate of unemployment at approximately 10%.
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Under the assumption of a large enough difference between the bargaining power of banks vis-
à-vis entrepreneurs (β ) with the elasticity of the rate at which entrepreneurs meet bankers with
respect to credit market tightness (ε), one can obtain an elasticity around 20 or even larger.
Under endogenous wages with bargaining power α of workers relative to firms, defined
as the joint bank-entrepreneur entity, all elasticities are divided by a factor 4 to 5, as was
established by Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005). Hence, the model requires more extreme values
of β or ε , (e.g., 0.95 or 0.05) to match the data. Alternatively, even with the "balanced" values
of β and ε , the model can generate large volatility in labor market tightness with less stringent
assumptions on α or the value of leisure of the unemployed z as compared to the ’small labor
surplus assumptions’ in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Another way of stating this is to say
that the "small surplus assumption" is no longer necessary on firms in the production stage:
it may be either on firms in the credit-prospection stage or on banks in the project-screening
stage.
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Technical Appendix to: The Cyclical Volatility of
Labor Markets under Frictional Financial Markets
Not intended for publication
A Introduction
This appendix details the derivation of the various equations and elasticities presented in the
main text. We begin by fully describing the stochastic model in discrete time.
A.1 Asset values of an entrepreneur
Ec,t = −e+ ptEl,t +(1− pt) 11+ rEtEc,t+1
El,t = −γ+ γ+ 11+ rEt
[
qtEg,t+1+(1−qt)El,t+1
]
Eg,t = yt−wt−ρt + 11+ rEt
[
sEc,t+1+(1− s)Eg,t+1
]
The cost of convincing a bank to fund future negative cash flows is e, and with probability
0 < pt < 1 this results in a successfull match within the period. During the second stage, the
bank covers the cost of recruiting a worker, γ , who is met with probability 0 < qt < 1. During
the production stage, y goods are produced which must cover both the wage rate w and interest
payments ρ . During the last stage, firms are subject to death shocks with probability s.
An assumption of free entry for entrepreneurs leads ept = El,t such that the final stage may
be simplified to
Eg,t = yt−wt−ρt +(1− s) 11+ rEtEg,t+1
A.2 Matching on credit markets
We follow the matching literature and assume that the total number of matches is governed by
a matching technology associating the total number of banks in stage 0, denoted byB, and the
total number of entrepreneurs in stage 0, denoted by E . Let MC(E ,B) be the matching process
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in the credit market. We have that p = MC(E ,B)/E . Symmetrically, the rate at which banks
find a project they are willing to finance is MC(E ,B)/B = φ p where φ = E /B. Under the
assumption of constant returns to scale of MC(E ,B), we have that p = p(φ) with p′(φ) < 0,
elasticity ε(φ) =−φ p′(φ)/p(φ), and it follows that φ is a natural measure of the tightness of
the credit market . We also make the assumptions
lim
φ−→0
p(φ) = 1
lim
φ−→+∞
p(φ) = 0
The first line states that in the relative scarcity of competing firms relative to banks, matching
with a banker is instantaneous, and the second line states that in the relative abundance of
competing firms relative to banks, matching with a banker is ifinitely slow.
A.3 Asset values for a banker
Bc,t = −κ+φt p(φt)Bl,t +(1−φt p(φt)) 11+ rEtBc,t+1
Bl,t = −γ+ 11+ rEt
[
qtBg,t+1+(1−qt)Bl,t+1
]
Bg,t = ρt +
1
1+ r
Et
[
sBc,t+1+(1− s)Bg,t+1
]
Bankers search for a suitable investment at a cost of κ and enter the recruiting stage with
probability φt p(φt) during which the vacancy cost γ must be disbursed. Meeting a worker
occurs at the rate qt , at which point a banker enters the production stage and the remuneration
ρ is received. An assumption of free entry for bankers leads κφt p(φt) = Bl,t ,
A.4 Time invariant credit market tightness
Free entry on both sides of the credit market, along with Nash bargaining over the surplus of
a credit relationship, results in a time invariant tightness. To show this, note first that we had
under free entry
Bl,t =
κ
φt p(φt)
; and El,t =
e
p(φt)
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Denoting the banker’s bargaining weight by β , and defining the credit relationship surplus as
SC,t = (El,t−Ec,t)+(Bl,t−Bc,t), results in El,tBl,t =
1−β
β and
φ∗ =
1−β
β
κ
e
A.5 Deriving a job creation condition:
It will be convenient at this stage to express the joint value of recruiting a worker to banker and
entrepreneur as Fl,t = El,t +Bl,t , which corresponds to the surplus from the credit relationhsip,
as
e
p(φ)
+
κ
φ p(φ)
=−γ+qt 11+ rEt
[
Eg,t+1+Bg,t+1
]
+(1−qt) 11+ r
[
e
p(φ)
+
κ
φ p(φ)
]
Define total costs on the credit market as K(φ)= ep(φ)+
κ
φ p(φ) and Γt ≡ γ+K(φ)
(
1− 11+r (1−qt)
)
,
then
Γt
qt
=
1
1+ r
Et
[
Eg,t+1+Bg,t+1
]
Using the Bellman equations for entrepreneur and banker during production to define [Eg,t +Bg,t ] =
Fg,t = yt−wt +(1−s) 11+rEt
[
Fg,t+1
]
, we obtain a job creation condition in the presence of fric-
tional credit and labor markets
Γt
qt
=
1
1+ r
Et
[
yt+1−wt+1+(1− s)Γt+1qt+1
]
Note that when the credit market is perfect K(φ) = 0 and Γt = γ such that the job creation
condition collapses to the familiar
γ
qt
=
1
1+ r
Et
[
yt+1−wt+1+(1− s) γqt+1
]
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A.6 Rental rate
This section provides the details in deriving the rental rate
Et [ρt+1] = βEt [yt+1−wt+1]+ (1−β )Et
[
(1+ r)γ
q(θt)
− (1− s)γ
q(θt+1)
]
Define the surplus to the credit relationship as SC,t = El,t +Bl,t . The sharing rule under
Nash bargaining implies Bl,t = βSC,t and El,t = (1−β )SC,t . Expanding on the former,
−γ+ 1
1+ r
Et
[
qtBg,t+1+(1−qt)Bl,t+1
]
= −βγ+βqt 11+ rEt
[
Eg,t+1+Bg,t+1
]
+β (1−qt) 11+ rEt
[
El,t+1+Bl,t+1
]
Rearranging terms,
EtBg,t+1+
(1−qt)
qt
EtBl,t+1 = (1−β )γ(1+ r)qt
+βEt
([
Eg,t+1+Bg,t+1
]
+
(1−qt)
qt
[
El,t+1+Bl,t+1
])
Et
[
ρt+1+
1
1+ r
(1− s)Bg,t+2
]
= (1−β )γ(1+ r)
qt
+βEt
[
yt+1−wt+1+(1− s) 11+ r
[
Bg,t+2+Eg,t+2
]]
+β
(1−qt)
qt
Et
[
El,t+1+Bl,t+1
]− (1−qt)
qt
EtBl,t+1
Since Bl,t = β
[
El,t +Bl,t
]
, EtBg,t+1 = (1−β ) γ(1+r)qt +βEt
[
Eg,t+1+Bg,t+1
]
, or
Et
[
(1−β )Bg,t+1−βEg,t+1
]
= (1−β )γ(1+ r)
qt
then
Et
[
ρt+1+
1
1+ r
(1− s)Bg,t+2
]
=(1−β )γ(1+ r)
qt
+βEt
[
yt+1−wt+1+(1− s) 11+ r
[
Bg,t+2+Eg,t+2
]]
and
Et [ρt+1] = βEt [yt+1−wt+1]+ (1−β )Et
[
(1+ r)γ
q(θt)
− (1− s)γ
q(θt+1)
]
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A.7 Workers and wages
An individual may be unemployed and earning income z < y. The unemployed meet job offers
at rate f (θ) = θq. Once employed, workers earn wage w until separation, which occurs with
probability s per unit of time. The Bellman equations describing each of these stages are
Ut = z+ f (θt)
1
1+ r
EtWt+1+(1− f (θt)) 11+ rEtUt+1
Wt = wt +
1
1+ r
Et [(1− s)Wt+1+ sUt+1]
We assume that the wage negotiated in a worker-firm pair in the presence of credit market
frictions, with surplus SL,t = Fg,t +Wt −Ut , satisfies αFg,t = (1−α)(Wt−Ut), where Fg,t =
Eg,t +Bg,t is the joint value of the firm to the entrenpreneur-banker pair. Applying this sharing
rule to the worker-firm surplus, first we have
SL,t = yt−wt +(1− s) 11+ rEtFg,t+1
wt +
1
1+ r
Et [(1− s)Wt+1+ sUt+1]− z− 11+ rEt [θtqtWt+1− (1−θtqt)Ut+1]
SL,t = yt− z+(1− s) 11+ rEt
[
Fg,t+1+Wt+1−Ut+1
]−θtqt 11+ rEt [Wt+1−Ut+1]
SL,t = wt− z+(1− s) 11+ rEtSL,t+1−αθtqt
1
1+ r
EtSL,t+1
and second, using Fg,t = (1−α)SL,t and Γtqt = 11+rEt(1−α)Fg,t+1,
yt−wt +(1− s) 11+ rEtFg,t+1 = (1−α)
(
yt− z+(1− s) 11+ rEtSL,t+1
)
−αθtΓt
Rearraging terms yield the wage rule under frictional labor and credit markets:
wt = α(yt +θtΓt)+(1−α)z
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B Deriving the elasticity of market tightness to a productiv-
ity shock
B.1 Cannonical framework
Assume the matching function is Cobb-Douglas such that q(θt) = χθ−ηt . Define period profit
flows as Π= y−w. Taking log linear deviations around a stationary steady state, η γ(1+r)q(θP) θ̂Pt =
ΠEtΠ̂t+1+η γ(1−s)q(θP) Et θ̂
P
t+1, and using the forward operator we have that
[
1− 1−s1+rEtL−1
]
θ̂Pt =
q(θP)Π
ηγ(1+r)EtΠ̂t+1 such that
θ̂Pt =
q(θP)Π
ηγ(1+ r)
Et
∞
∑
i=0
(
1− s
1+ r
)i
Π̂t+1+i
Deviations of market tightness are forward looking, discounting future deviations of profits.
Using the definition of the wage wt = α (yt + γθt)+(1−α)z:
θ̂Pt =
q(θP)(1−α)
ηγ(1+ r)
Et
∞
∑
i=0
Ψiŷt+1+i
where Ψ =
(1−s
1+r
)− αθPq(θP)η(1+r) . Assuming that productivity follows an AR(1) with persistance
parameter 0 < ρy < 1 and innovation νt as white noise, then
θ̂Pt =
q(θP)(1−α)
ηγ(1+ r)
∞
∑
i=0
Ψiρ i+1y νt
so that θ̂Pt =
q(θP)(1−α)
ηγ(1+r)
(
1
1−Ψρy
)
ρyνt , and
∂ θ̂Pt
∂νt
=
(1−α)q(θP)ρy
ηγ(1+ r)− γ [η(1− s)−α f (θ)]ρy (20)
To check the result, note that if ρy = 1 this is the elasticity obtained when comparing steady
states, or to a permanent productivity shock, as in Shimer (2005), i.e. (1−α)
γ
[
η(r+δ )
q(θ) +αθ
] .
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B.2 Frictional credit markets - fixed wage
Recall the job creation condition Γtqt =
1
1+rEt
[
yt+1−w+(1− s)Γt+1qt+1
]
, with Γt ≡ γ+K
(
1− 11+r (1−qt)
)
and q(θt)= χθ−ηt . Taking log linear deviations around a stationary steady state:
γ(1+r)
q(θ)
[
γ+K( r1+r )
]
θ̂t =
Et ŷt+1+ η(1−s)q(θ)
[
γ+K( r1+r )
]
Et θ̂t+1. Call γT ≡
[
γ+K( r1+r )
]
, then
[
1− 1−s1+rEtL−1
]
θ̂t = q(θ)ηγT (1+r)Et ŷt+1,
and
θ̂t =
q(θ)
ηγT (1+ r)
Et
∞
∑
i=0
(
1− s
1+ r
)i
ŷt+1+i
If productivity follows the same AR(1) process, then θ̂t = q(θ)ηγT (1+r)Et
∞
∑
i=0
(1−s
1+r
)iρ i+1y νt , θ̂t =
q(θ)
ηγT (1+r)
(
ρy
1− 1−s1+rρy
)
νt and
∂ θ̂t
∂νt
=
q(θ)ρy
ηγT [(1+ r)− (1− s)]ρy (21)
B.3 Frictional credit markets -flexible wage
If the wage outcome is wt = α [yt +Γtθt ]+(1−α)z, we can write the job creation condition as
Γt
qt
=
1
1+ r
Et
[
(1−α)(yt+1− z)−αΓt+1θt+1+(1− s)Γt+1qt+1
]
.
The following preparatory steps are usefull. First, write Γt = γT + K1+r q(θt). Then take log-
linear deviation around a stationary steady state of the job creation condition:
η(1+ r)
q(θ)
γT θ̂t = (1−α)Et ŷt+1−α
(
γTθ +
K
1+ r
(1−η) f (θ)
)
Et θ̂t+1
+
η(1+ s)
q(θ)
γTEt θ̂t+1
θ̂t =
(1−α)q(θ)
ηγT (1+ r)
Et ŷt+1
+
[
(1+ s)
(1+ r)
− αq(θ)
ηγT (1+ r)
(
γTθ +
K
1+ r
(1−η) f (θ)
)]
Et θ̂t+1
Calling Φ ≡
[
(1+s)
(1+r) −
αq(θ)
ηγT (1+r)
(
γTθ + K1+r (1−η) f (θ)
)]
, we then follow similar steps by ob-
taining:
θ̂t =
(1−α)q(θ)
ηγT (1+ r)
Et
∞
∑
i=0
Φiŷt+1+i
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and making use of the specification for labor productivity, θ̂t = (1−α)q(θ)ηγT (1+r) Et
∞
∑
i=0
Φiρ i+1y νt . Fi-
nally θ̂t = (1−α)q(θ)ηγT (1+r)
(
ρy
1−Φρy
)
νt and
∂ θ̂t
∂νt
=
(1−α)q(θ)ρy
ηγT (1+ r)− [ηγT (1+ s)−α f (θ)(γT +(1−η)κ˜)]ρy
where κ˜ ≡ K q(θ)1+r .
C Additional numerical results
The baseline results kept the unemployment rate constant by adjusting the labor matching
function’s level parameter χ . We show in the following table the this level parameter in the
labor matching function has no incidence on the propagation of productivity shocks when
wages are fixed.
Table A1: Keeping χ fixed
q(θ) Wage U rate Elasticity of θ
Financial
accelerator M f
Pissarides
- fixed wage 0.11 0.75 0.08 6.48 1
Credit friction - fixed wage
β = 0.5,ε = 0.5 0.20 0.75 0.08 11.57 1.79
β = 0.2,ε = 0.8 0.72 0.75 0.24 39.11 6.04
β = 0.8,ε = 0.2 0.72 0.75 0.24 39.11 6.04
31
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Creditor bargaining weight β
Ela
sti
cit
y t
o p
rod
uc
tivi
ty 
sh
oc
k
 
 
Frictional credit market
Pissarides
Figure 3: Elasticity of labor market labor tightness to productivity shocks.
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Figure 4: Two cases for the credit market and the financial multiplier.
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